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Marine Transport, Cargo Risks, and
the Hamburg Rules - Rationalization

or Imagery?
John A. Maher*
Joan D. Maher**
I.
A.

Introduction
General

One of the most curious overt American diplomatic maneuvers
in 1979 was the almost unheralded signing of the United Nations
Convention on the Carriageof Goods by Sea, 1978.' Fated by tradition and formal resolution to be known as the Hamburg Rules,2 the
Convention is remarkable in various particulars.
The aim of the Convention is reorientation of well-established
multinational rules applying directly to common carriage by water.
These rules limit consensual allocation of cargo risks implicit in
marine transport. Limitations on freedom to contract for transport
have immediate significance to shippers and consignees, their
financiers, transporters for hire, and the respective insurers of contending cargo and carrier interests. Consensual allocations or risk
between shippers and common carriers by water in the domestic and
international trades of the United States are limited by the Harter
Act of 1893' and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936
(COGSA).4 The latter is, in substantial part, a counterpart of the
Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to
Bills of Lading of.1924,5 better known as the Hague Rules,6 to which
*
A.B., 1951 U. of Notre Dame, LL.B. 1956, & LL.M. (Trade Regulation), 1957, New
York U.; Professor Dickinson School of Law.
** B.A. 1976, The U. of the State of New York; J.D., 1980, Dickinson School of Law.
1. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I(1978).
2. Id, Annex III.
3. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1976).
4. Id §§ 1300-1315 (1976). COGSA displaced application of the Harter Act from lading through discharge in international carriage.
5. A. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 37-71 (1953).
6. See, e.g., id at 116, 125-31; G. GILMORE& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 143
(2d ed. 1975); N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 500 (1974); A.

the United States7 and many other trading nations8 are party. Although aimed at international common carriage, the Hague Rules
and COGSA are quite susceptible of domestic application and have
a decided, albeit indirect, impact on private carriage for hire.9 Any
potency for changing these expressions, and the substantial multinational bodies of judicial precedent elaborating them, obviously demands careful scrutiny by those counselling importers, exporters,
carriers by water, and marine risk underwriters.
The HamburgRules present such a potency. Adherence to them
involves explicit denunciation of the Hague Rules. Underlying the
effort to reorient current rules concerning risk allocation is a desire
to mitigate their assumed bias in favor of carriers to the consequent
prejudice of shippers and consignees. Implicit in the proposed formulations is a disregard for commercial reality, which sets the stage
for frustrating rising expectations of the Hamburg Rules proponents
to the degree that they are innocent of the inexorable process dictating that any increase in transporters' insurance costs becomes part of
freight to be borne by cargo interests.
No less remarkable, although of transitory significance, is the
immediate context in which the United States' signature to the
HamburgRules was supplied. While legislative action' ° is a sine qua
non to the Rules becoming law, so curious were the circumstances of
American subscription that congressional inquiry is warranted.
Early consideration is preferred but Congress should not delay. beyond Presidential submission of the Rules for congressional approval. The authors hasten to say that pecularities in the State
Department's handling of the subscription question do not necessarily taint the HamburgRules. By the same token, development of data
to the effect that the questionable procedure was innocent in purpose
will not hallow the Rules. Regardless of the circumstances, endorseMOCATTA, M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, SCRUTTON ON CHARTERPARTIES AND BILLS OF LADING
403-09 (18th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as A. MOCAT-rA].
7. 51 Stat. 233 (1937).
8. A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 451-95; A. MOCATrA, supra note 6, at 511-21.
9. COGSA invites consensual displacement of application of the Harter Act to loading
through discharge in "coastwise" carriage by sea. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976). In the international sphere, the Hague Rules and COGSA contemplate applicability to the carrier-holder
relationship when bills of lading issued at the instance of a charterer are negotiated to a third
party. Hague Rules, Art. I(b); A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 41. Further, it is not uncommon
for chartering brokers to include the "United States Clause Paramount" in a voyage charter
with the result that the charter itself becomes subject to COGSA. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 6, at 199; N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, supra note 6, at 504; A. MOCATTA, supra note 6,
at 405 n.12.
10. The Hamburg Rules could be submitted to the Senate for the exercise of its treaty
power or the substance of the Rules could be offered as a bill in either House of Congress.
Adoption of COGSA and subsequent adhesion to the Hague Rules as subordinated to
COGSA were accomplished by pursuing both routes. See notes 4 and 7 supra. For an example of adoption of the substance of the Hague Rules without formal adherence to them, see the
Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1936, 1 EDW. 8, ch. 49 (1936); A. KNAUTH, supra
note 5, at 17-26.

ment by a conference of seventy-eight nations including the United
States demands serious attention. This need is accentuated when a
significant body of commercial law, held in common by the United
States and numerous other trading nations, is targeted for supersession.
To accommodate evaluation of the Hamburg Rules, the authors
outline the evolution and salient features of pertinent American law
and subsequently remark the proposed substitute. First, however,
the subscription process in which the State Department indulged
must be mentioned.
B. A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Turtle Bay via Foggy
Bottom
In March 1978, a conference convened by direction of the
United Nations' General Assembly adopted the Final Act of the
United Nations Convention of the Carriageof Goods by Sea, 1978 "
and invited adherence by individual nations." Compliance involves
explicit denunciation of the Hague Rules, "3to which the United
States is a party' 4 and upon which COGSA is based. During an
initial period ending April 30, 1979, the Hamburg Rules were open
for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York. 5 On
that day, the United States signed and thereby joined twenty-six
other nations as original signatories.' 6 Accession by all other nations
is invited.' 7 Original signatories, however, enjoy somewhat of a maneuvering advantage. Their subscription does not betoken adoption,
and their full adherence is subject to ratification through normal domestic constitutional processes.' I Neither ratification nor accession
may include reservations. t9 The Rules become effective as to "con11. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13 (1978).
12. Id, Annex I, art. 28 (1978).
13. Id at art. 31.
14. 51 Stat. 233 (1937).
15. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 28(1) (1978).
16. Signatories on March 31, 1978, were Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Federal Republic
of Germany, Ghana, Madagascar, Mexico, Panama, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, Venezuela,
and Vatican City. The following nations signed throughout the thirteen months concluding
April 30, 1979: Phillipines; Sierra Leone; Czechoslovakia; Pakistan; Denmark; Finland;
France; Norway; Sweden; Zaire; Hungary; and Austria. Egypt ratified the convention on
April 23, 1979. Thereafter, Uganda and Tanzania announced accession. Letter from P.
Giblain, Chief, Treaty Section, U.N. Secretariat-General, to John A. Maher (February 15,
1980). It is interesting to note that only two Warsaw Pact nations were among the original
signatories and neither has a seacoast, although both are quite involved with river traffic. It is
said that at The Hamburg Conference the U.S.S.R., Ukrania, Byelo Russia, Bulgaria, and
Poland advanced "strong shipowning viewpoints" while Czechoslovakia, GDR, and Hungary
stated "cargo" viewpoints. REPORT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE HAMBURG CONFERENCE para. 24 (Feb. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].

17. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex 1, art. 28(3) (1978).
18. Id, art. 28(2).
19. Id, art. 29. Czechoslovakia's signature, however, was accompanied by what appears
to be a reservation concerning conversion rates to be employed in limitation of liability formu-

tracting parties" on the first day of the month following expiration of
a year from official communication of ratification or accession by
20
twenty nations.
American ratification of the Hamburg Rules would alter norms
explicit and implicit in not only COGSA but also the Fire Statute of
1851. Inevitably, the ratification process will include reconsideration of the Harter Act of 1893.
The well-respected and extraordinarily professional Maritime
Law Association of the United States (MLA) is no stranger to evolution of uniform multinational rules affecting maritime operations
and transactions. Indeed, long before diplomatic intervention, MLA
was a real force in formulating what became the Hague Rules and
other codifications of international import. 2' The Association maintains a Committee on Bills of Lading, which, understandably, has
great interest in evolutions such as the one that produced the
Hamburg Rules.
As previously noted, the final day to become an original signatory to the HamburgRules was April 30, 1979. Fortuitously, the-Association's annual meeting was scheduled for May 4, 1979. Consider
this extract from the committee chairman's report at that meeting:
First I'm going to tell you a tale of what happened at Foggy Bottom on Monday of this week. I was telephoned at 2:30 Monday

afternoon by the Deputy Legal Advisor of the State Department ....

He told me that the Legal Advisor had decided that

the United States should not sign the Hamburg Rules.
The next morning at 9 o'clock he telephoned to say that
sometime in the late afternoon, as far as he knew . . .after 3

o'clock, but we found out later it started at 4:15, some Government Representatives from other Departments had gotten to the
Deputy Secretary, who.

. .

minds the store when Cy Vance is out

in the Middle East and so forth, and the Deputy Secretary had
decided that the United States should sign the Hamburg Rules.
They were signed

.

. 5:45 p.m., 15 minutes under the wire.

We understand that the reason advanced for the United
States to sign ... was the lack of credibility of our diplomats who
negotiate things which the United States doesn't sign. I am serious. That was the reason. That's why the United States is now a
signatory.
22
lae. See general, text accompanying notes 192-95 infra. The word "reservation" was avoided
as Czechoslovakia "declares" the conversion rate in its territory. Letter from P. Giblain, supra
note 16.
20. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex 1,art. 30(I) (1978).
21. A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 124-27.
22. Maritime Law Association, Doc. No. 618, 7019-20 (May 4, 1979). It should be noted
that the gentleman quoted, the distinguished John C. Moore of New York's Admiralty Bar,
was a member of the United States delegation to the Hamburg Conference. REPORT, supra
note 16, at para. 7.
Assuming the accuracy of this report, it speaks loudly concerning the psychologies of
some of those involved in diplomatic formulations of not only rules as to water carriage but
also such evolutions as the ongoing address to SALT or a U.N. Code for Transnationals.

Even if Congress fails to investigate the particulars of the quick
shuffle accompanying the United States' signing of the Hamburg
Rules, it must be prepared to hear the next version of the same argument: to wit, the United States should not sign the products of multilateral negotiation unless it intends to implement them fully lest its
diplomats and its institutional signature lose credibility. Permitting
such chatter to substitute for reasoned analysis would be abdication
of the legislative duty. The authors, however, reassert their belief
that the Hamburg Rules are not so tainted by the State Department's
conduct that less than serious attention to the merits may be excused.
In addition, the authors regret that, in other nations, American signature may be misconceived or even misrepresented as considered
endorsement.
C

Pressuresfor Regulation

Cargoes handled by water carriers are exposed to many threats.
Many factors, acting singly or in combination, may prove the immediate cause of cargo loss or degradation. Among common causes of
damage are adulteration, delays in transit, fire, immersion, infestation, over-exposure to natural elements, over-heating, pilferage,
seepage, and sweating. These may be generated or aggravated by
improper packing, lading, stowage, discharge, or the intrinsic nature
of goods in addition to unseaworthiness, general average sacrifice, or
events such as collision." Quite apart from the obvious connotation
of physical readiness to withstand the rigors of a projected voyage,
"seaworthiness" refers to vessel suitability for reception and carriage
of particular commodities for which transport has been contracted.
Whether or not a vessel is seaworthy when a voyage begins, cargo
damage may be generated or aggravated by errors in vessel operation, failures in cargo-care and custody, or force majeure. Neither
unseaworthiness at the beginning of a voyage nor deviation from an
agreed course or schedule necessarily dictates cargo damage or loss.
Similarly, neither seaworthiness leaving port nor dispatch in conducting the agreed voyage immunizes cargo from unfortunate consequences.
If left to their own devices and relative bargaining positions,
Whether these attitudes are rooted in assumption of a moral aristocracy of some sort or a
narrower belief that all nations give blank checks to their professional and ad hoc diplomats,
or something more malign, the authors cannot venture. That such attitudes are unhealthy
need not be stated.
Any urging that there is a duty to sign whatever ad hoc delegates may have endorsed in a
given multilateral setting, lest future negotiants in an infinite series of settings be denied credibility, is nothing better than a bid for a blank check. Whether authoritative levels of the State
Department have the management skill to maintain a coordinated grasp of all such settings is
not a question susceptible of answer. By definition, possession and exercise of that skill is
transitory in any given administration.

carriers would seek to contract against any liability for cargo loss or
damage while shippers would try to cast carriers as insurers of safe
and timely delivery. In terms of an ideal market, leverage predicated
on relative abundance or scarcity of bottoms and cargoes would be
the determining factor in each negotiation for carriage. Only an obvious surplus of suitable bottoms would afford leverage to shippers,
and then only if the affected vessel operators refrained from cartelization. This clash of intrinsic interests cannot be peculiar to any
trading nation and promotes similarity, if not uniformity, of viewpoints held by shippers and consignees of differing nationalities as
opposed to marine transporters of various flags. The ideal market is
far from reality. While the chartering market is relatively free, common carriers' operations are regulated in various particulars. Cartels
or cartel-like associations of vessel operators (with particular emphasis on those maintaining liner services) enjoy various degrees of official sanction,2 3 even from the United States. 24 More or less
scheduled liner services are a common resource for shippers of quantities insufficient in bulk to warrant chartering the entire capacity of
a vessel. By definition, shippers of such limited quantities can apply
less immediate leverage to carriers than shippers who find it feasible
to enter the chartering market.
Other factors contribute to international similarities in competing commercial attitudes. Various steps implicit in international
trade are essentially and inescapably repetitive in terms of traders'
continuing operations. To the degree this is true, it is wasteful to
renegotiate each and every word and phrase descriptive of those
steps, particularly when many different languages have potential use.
Hence, various terms of art have evolved and are used on an international basis. 25 An additional pressure toward uniformity is provided
by insurance and reinsurance. Both cargo and hull risks are quite
commonly placed or reinsured in or through a limited number of
markets of which London continues to be the exemplar. At the risk
of over-simplification, underwriters on Lime Street or elsewhere can
be more confident in assessing risks (and the worth of subrogation
rights) if discrete national laws pertaining to cargo losses are not
only predictable but also similar, in their likely consequence, to
those laws with which the underwriters and their immediate legal
counsellors are most familiar.
With this background, it is appropriate to look to the general
23. See, e.g., Break out the Jolly Roger! Shipping Pirates Swarm Aboard, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1980, at 67-68.
24. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 990-93. That an intragovernmental split
concerning conferences exists is no secret. For a recent manifestation, see United States Dept.
of Justice Release AT of February 4, 1980.
25. See, e.g., International Rules for the Interpretation of Trade Terms, a/k/a "Intercom
1953," (Chambre de Commerce Internationale, Paris 1953).

maritime law predating statutory focus on common carriers' ability
to avoid liability for cargo loss attributable to vessel operation. It is
well to remember that the general maritime law, like the common
law, still has vitality.2 6 Thus, it will obtain when and to the extent
Hater, COGSA or other statutory schemes are inapplicable.
D. General Maritime Law
While frequently described as "insurers" of the safe arrival of
cargo because of obligations implicit in the general maritime law,
common carriers by sea were scarcely mandatory insurers against all
risks. Thus, in the American usage, a carrier was not liable for loss
caused by Act of God, act of war, perils of the sea, and other species
of force majeure perceived as common to maritime venturing (and
presumed to be beyond a carrier's control) provided that the contract
of affreightment excepted those causes and the carrier was not at
fault.2 7 This formulation, however, was not susceptible of automatic
application. A cargo claimant's case in chief consisted of proving the
defendant carrier's receipt of goods in good order and non-delivery
or delivery in damaged condition. Thereafter, defendant bore the
burden of proving efficacy of an excepted cause. The cargo interest
could then respond with proof of at least concurrent fault on the part
of the carrier.
Shippers could self-insure, or purchase whatever insurance was
available, against occurrence of perils for which carriers ordinarily
lacked responsibility. Since unseaworthiness and neglect of a carrier's personnel were deemed to be within a carrier's control, a warranty of seaworthiness was implied by general maritime law.
However, bills of lading became phrased in such manner as seemingly shifted virtually all responsibility for cargo damage from carriers to shippers,2 8 a status quite antithetical to that of an insurer.
Bills of lading eventually included an exoneration from damages for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. This led some
26. See, e.g., Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), for the Supreme
Court's evolutionary provision of a maritime wrongful death action.
27. The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858). English and American
courts can be reluctant to apply even recognized exceptions. A very recent example, albeit
under COGSA, was the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's refusal to
allow the scuttling of the vessel by a deranged crewmember to be characterized as beyond the
shipowner's control. In re Intercontinental Prop. Mgt. S.A., as owner of M/V Mimi, 604 F.2d
254 (4th Cir. 1979).
28. The clauses limiting liability were worded along the following lines:
ILloss or damage. . . resulting from any of the following perils, whether arisingfrom
the negligence, default, or errorin.judgment of the master, mariners, . . . or others of
the crew, or otherwise whosoever, namely accidents to fittings, . . . want of space, air
or water, accidents to condensing apparatus, tanks, or machinery diminishing or injuring the supply of water or air, . . . breakage of shaft, or any latent defect in machinery, or appartenances, accidents from steam, machinery, or boilers, or any
damage or injury thereto, however caused. . ..
In re Missouri S.S. Co., [1889] 42 Ch.D. 321.

courts to accept contractual dilution of the warranty of seaworthiness
to a duty to use due diligence to furnish a seaworthy vessel.2 9
In Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., the
United States Supreme Court called a halt to the dilution process by
holding that operation of these contractual exonerations was subject
to overriding obligations to furnish a seaworthy vessel for the agreed
voyage and to exert due care for cargo.3" This formulation left the
United States out-of-step with the then all important United Kingdom, which gave greater respect to a supposed freedom of contract.
In the United States, the general maritime law thesis concerning concurrent fault was retained and even accentuated to the effect that, if
breach of one of the obligations rooted in policy merely contributed
to cargo loss, utility of agreed exceptions was denied.3 '
During this evolution, the Fire Statute of 185132 provided an
additional exception to the general duty of seaworthiness. The statute provides a vessel owner with immunity for cargo loss caused by
shipboard fire "unless . . .caused by the design or neglect of such
owners."3 3 The burden of proving the owner's complicity rests with
34
the cargo interest seeking recovery for fire loss.
The Liverpool& Great Western decision, and the heavier burden
it placed on carriers than did United Kingdom jurisprudence, set the
stage for Congress' renewed involvement in the struggle concerning
risk allocation.
II.

United States Statutes Limiting Risk Allocation in Marine
Contracts of Carriage

A.

General Statutory Provisions

The Harter Act, COGSA, and analogous schemes in other
countries address risk of loss in common carriage on three principal
levels: they (1) mandate issuance and minimum content of bills of
lading in specified circumstances; (2) restrain carriers' ability to impose contractual provisions against liability for cargo damage; and
(3) prescribe rules for allocating liability that can operate indepen29. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 141.
30. 129 U.S. 397, 438-63 (1889).
31. Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 272 (1851).
32. The Fire Statute is codified as part of the Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1976). Section 186 provides that charterers who "man, victual and navigate . . .[the vessel] . . . at his own expense, or by his own procurement, shall be deemed the
owner of such vessel within the meaning of. . .this chapter relating to the limitation of the
liability of the owners of vessels ...." Thus, demise charterers are entitled to the benefit of
the Fire Statute although time charterers are not.
33. 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976).
34. Earle & Stoddart v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420 (1932). Pressure for
such legislation is easily appreciated if one reflects that while fire at sea is always a fearsome
thing, it must have been particularly threatening when steam propulsion was introduced in the
days of wooden hulls and masts.

dently of contract. The statutes' thrust is to define spheres in which
carriers legitimately can avoid liability. In addition, COGSA and its
analogues address not only the degree to which carriers can limit
monetary damages attendant upon actual liability but also some circumstances in which shippers can incur liability to the carrier.
Neither Harter nor COGSA deals with the validity of rights acquired through transfer of bills of lading by negotiation or otherwise,
implicitly but nonetheless effectively deferring to legislation such as
the Pomerene Act3 5 or Article 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Standing to assert a claim in an American forum may depend upon
foreign law if issuance and/or negotiation of an ocean bill occurred
outside the United States even though COGSA is literally applicable
to cargo liability and indemnity issues. This can produce an apparent paradox because COGSA purports to speak to carrier liability
with respect to international shipments entering and leaving United
States ports even though the relevant documents issue in another
country. In contrast, the Pomerene Act relates only to ocean bills
issued in the United States for shipments abroad,36 deferring to
countries of origin concerning bills issued there. The Hague Rules
and other countries' early counterparts to COGSA did not automatically apply to imports3 7 although they, like COGSA, contemplated
permissive incorporation by reference.3 8 Thus, in the United States,
the potency exists for simultaneous application of foreign law relating to meaningfulness of issuance or negotiation of an ocean bill and
United States law concerning disclaimers of liability explicit on a
foreign-origin bill in the hands of a United States consignee. 39 This
anamoly can occur although both issuer and issuee are external and
alien to the United States, the basic agreement for transport was
made outside the United States, and the parties were ignorant of
American intent to regulate terms of contracts negotiated and undertaken in other countries. Of course, this creates difficulties only to
the extent COGSA differs from the law of the place of contracting or
the law selected by the parties as governing. While the Hague Rules
35. 49 U.S.C.
36. Id §81.

§§ 81-124 (1976).

37. See, e.g., Art. X of Hague Rules in A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 62; § 2 of Canadian
Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1936, id at 17.
38. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976). A diplomatic conference on maritime law held in Brussels
during February 12-23, 1968, produced a Protocol commending various changes in the Hague
Rules to the nations. The Protocol is sometimes referred to as the Visby Amendments, honoring a precursor but nondiplomatic conference that met at Stockholm and Visby. Among these
changes is a considerable broadening of the sweep of the Rules to embrace not only shipments
to and from contracting nations but also situations in which bills are issued in a contracting
state albeit the carriage in question neither commenced nor terminated there. The United
States has not adopted the VisbyAmendments, which are in effect in thirteen nations. M.L.A.
doc. no. 618, .rupra note 22, at 7025. The United Kingdom's Carriageof Goods by Sea Act
1971 represented such an adoption. A. MOCATrA, supra note 6, at 450-67.
39. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 130-32.

remain common to many of the most important trading nations,
there is minimal opportunity for difficulty.
B.

The HarterAct of 1893

Section 4 of the Harter Act 4° mAldates issuance of a detailed
"bill of lading, or shipping document" upon receipt of "lawful merchandise" (except live animals)4 ' for marine transport. This document, which must account for cargo in terms of identifying marks,
quantity, and condition, is prima facie evidence of receipt of the described goods. 42 Failure to issue a bill exposes the responsible agent,
owner, or master to a43 fine of $2,000 of which the "injured" shipper is
entitled to one-half.
The Harter Act forbids clausing marine bills of lading or shipping documents issued in domestic or international trades in a manner that relieves vessel owners or operators from liability for (1) "loss
or damage arising from negligence, fault, or failure in proper loading,
stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery" of cargo 44 or (2) failure to
use "due diligence" to "properly equip, man, provision, and outfit
Violation of this
[the] vessel, and to make [it] seaworthy. . . .
prohibition exposes the vessel and others to the penalty structure remarked in connection with failure to issue a bill. 46 Thus, Congress
effected a compromise by stepping back from the warranty of seaworthiness while foreign and domestic vessels accepting cargoes to
or from United States ports were subjected alike to a regime mandating irreducible duties of diligence to achieve seaworthiness and care
for cargo. The point was underscored by the declaration that stipulations to avoid liability for neglect, fault, or failure in cargo care are
void.4 7
More favorable for, but nonetheless threatening to, vessel owners was Section 3 of the Act.4 8 Prior to affording a shopping list of
exceptions from carrier liability for cargo damage caused by conditions beyond the control of carriers, Section 3 provides that
If the owner of any vessel transporting . ..property to or from
any [United States] port . . . shall exercise due diligence to make
the. . . vessel in allrespects seaworthy. . . neither the vessel, her
. . .owners, agent, or charterers, shall become or be held respon40. 46 U.S.C. § 193 (1976).
41. Id § 195.
42. Id § 193.
43. Id § 194. A maritime lien in the vessel is enforceable in a United States District
Court for the total of the fine and costs.
44. Id § 190 (emphasis supplied). COGSA preempted the Harter Act from application
to international carriage from lading through discharge. Id §§ 1302, 1311, 1312.
45. Id § 191.
46. Id § 194.
47. Id § 190.
48. Id § 192.

sible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or .

.

. management of said vessel ....

Note that this exculpation from vicarious liability for errors in vessel
operation is available ex proprio vigore if due diligence to achieve
seaworthiness is exerted, albeit unsuccessfully. In theory, the result
is quite favorable to owners and somewhat beneficial to charterers
(who themselves accept cargoes from third parties) because, once the
owner has exercised due care concerning seaworthiness, neither
owner nor charterer is liable for errors in vessel management or navigation committed by those actually conducting the agreed voyage.
To be sure, carriers can contract for stricter liability. Congress'
avoidance of overgenerosity to carriers was implicit in denial of the
exoneration for cargo damage caused by failure in vessel management when the defendant carrier is unable to prove due diligence to
achieve seaworthiness although the cargo damage in question was not
causedby unseaworthiness. It is patent that this was the product of an
"in terrorem" approach to motivating carriers to care for the seaworthiness of their vessels.
It must be noted that the Harter Act fails to define key words or
terms. As a consequence, the Act does not appear to be limited to
common carriage and, more particularly, shipping documents in
connection with such transport. Yet, the case law is to the contrary.50
Passage of the Harter Act set the stage for a long effort toward
codification of a uniform multinational approach. Ultimately, a series of international, nondiplomatic conferences sponsored by the
Comite Maritime International and the International Law Association produced the Hague Rules. A diplomatic conference in 1924
commended the Rules to the nations.5 '
C

COGSA

Twelve years later, the United States not only adopted COGSA
as domestic legislation 52 but also formally adhered,5 3 with limited
49. Id (emphasis supplied). The balance of the section sets forth exceptions:
[Flor losses arising from dangers of the sea. . acts of God, or public enemies, or the
inherent defect, quality, or vice of the thing carried, or from insufficiency of package,
or seizure under legal process, or ... act or omission of the shipper . . . , or from
saving or attempting to save life or property at sea, or from any deviation in rendering such service.
50. The G.R. Crowe, 294 F. 506 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 586 (1924) (Harter
Act inapplicable to charter parties unless incorporated therein). See, e.g., G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 6, at 207-09.
It must be noted that the Harter Act explicitly saved the Fire Statute from implicit repeal
or modification. 46 U.S.C. § 196 (1976).
51. A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 122-27.
52. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976).
53. 51 Stat. 233 (1937). This action does not appear to have been all that belated. Although Belgium, Hungary, the United Kingdom, and Spain ratified in the late twenties or

reservations termed "understandings," 5 4 to the Hague Rules. While
COGSA substantially tracks the Hague Rules, it does not do so slavishly, and the differences are the subject of the reservations."
1. Coverage.-- COGSA did not repeal Harter, but instead
preempted most of its application to internationalwater carriage.56
By its terms, COGSA governs from actual lading to discharge of
cargo,57 other than live animals, to be stowed belowdecks.5 8 Harter
remains applicable to domestic carriage by water 59 but is limited in
international carriage to the periods from a carrier's receipt of goods
through commencement of lading and, after the voyage, from discharge through delivery of goods.6"
Excluding deck cargo from COGSA's "tackle-to-tackle" reach
gives rise to a curious consequence. Cargo scheduled for carriage on
weatherdecks is remitted to the general maritime law upon commencement of loading through conclusion of discharge in international carriage. 6 ' It continues to be covered by Harter in domestic
trades and during carrier custodial periods before loading and after
discharge in international trades. Carriage of goods on weather
decks in international trades denies a carrier's right to limit damages
if that carriage is in breach of duty to carry belowdecks. Anyone
who has viewed a modern containership will recognize that neither
shipper nor carrier of "containerized" cargo can be entirely content
with such a labyrinth of formulae.6 2
early thirties, France, Germany, Italy, and the Scandanavian countries also acted in the late
thirties.
54. A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 77-85. The total number of nations observing the Hague
Rules is uncertain due to subsequent independence of many jurisdictions for which colonialist
powers announced adoption. Forty-two nations have effected formal ratifications or accessions.
55. The leading difference in COGSA was the address to carriage of goods to as well as
from ports of the United States. Other leading differences include provisions against implied
repeal or modification of the Pomerene and Harter Acts in their spheres as well as the Fire
Statute and other statutes; explication that receivers' failure to note cargo damage when accepting goods was not a bar to later litigation; and avoidance of a gold standard in an overall
limitation of liability. A. KNAUTlH, supra note 5, at 78-85.
56. 46 U.S.C. § 1300, 1311, 1312(1976).
57. Id § 1301(e).
58. Id § 1301(c). Note that only deck cargo described as such in the contract for carriage
is excluded from "goods" comprehended by COGSA. A clean bill of lading is, in effect, a
representation that cargo will be struck below, St. Johns N.F. Ship. Corp. v. S.A. Comp. Geral
Comm. do Rio de Janiero, 263 U.S. 119 (1923), or otherwise shielded from the elements by a
structural enclosure. See A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 236-37.
59. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1308, 1312 (1976).
60. Id § 1311.
61. The applicability of Harter in international water carriage is limited to carriers'
preloading and post-discharge custodial periods. Id Precluding application from "tackle-totackle" in international carriage means that neither COGSA nor Hater reaches cargoes intended for stowage on or above weather decks although Harter did apply before adoption of
COGSA.
62. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours Int'l S.A. v. The Mormacvega, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1974).

a. Charterparties.-COGSAexplicitly excludes application to
charterparties per se.63 Nonetheless, it applies "from the moment"
bills issued to charterers are negotiated to third parties.' Harter
may be preempted from part of its normal domestic application by
the parties' agreement to apply COGSA from lading through discharge. 65 The attractiveness of this preemption to a carrier can be
judged from the simple fact that neither the Hague Rules nor
COGSA adopted the conditioned (and what amounts to an in terrorem) approach to exoneration from liability for faults in vessel
management contained in Harter.6 6 Note well that this explicit leave
to substitute COGSA for Harter in domestic trades does not extend,
on an explicit level, to the custodial periods before lading and after
off-loading.6 7
2. Liberalizationfor Carriers.-Both Harter and COGSA enumerate circumstances in which carriers can be exonerated from liability for loss, damage, and delay caused by Act of God, act of a
public enemy, shipper's fault, or inherent vice of goods. By denying
leave to contract for greater carrier immunity,68 each statute aims at
holding carriers liable for at least those cargo losses caused by neglect in preparing the vessel for the voyage; in lading, stowage, and
discharge of cargo; and, in cargo care during the voyage. Of the two
statutes, only Harter demands the same responsibility during carrier
custodial periods before and after lading.69 As noted earlier,7"
Harter punishes failure in due diligence to secure seaworthiness by
denying exemption for cargo loss occasioned by navigation and vessel management lapses even though they are unrelatedto unseaworthiness at commencement of the voyage.7" COGSA dispensed with
this in terrorem approach.72 Further, COGSA literally exonerates
carriers from liability for loss or damage caused by actual unseaworthiness !f due diligence to achieve seaworthiness was exerted
prior to commencing the agreed voyage 73 while Harter merely permits a carrier to contract for exoneration.74 The same difference is
apparent in the Acts' respective approaches to exoneration for fail63. 46 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976). "Carrier," however, is defined to include not only vessel
owners but also the charterer "who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper." Id
§ 1301(a).
64. Id § 1301(b).
65. Id § 1312.
66. Id § 192.
67. Id § 1311.
68. Id §§ 190, 191, 1303(8).
69. Compare id § 190 with §§ 1301(e) and 1302 (1976).
70. See text at note 49 supra.
71. The Isis, 290 U.S. 333 (1933).
72. 46 U.S.C. §1304(2)(a) (1976).
73. Id § 1304(1).
74. Id § 191.

ures in cargo care. 75 COGSA's focus on cargo care from "tackle-to'
tackle" should not blind one to the pragmatic truth that much of
what each act commands by way of due diligence to achieve seaworthiness can be achieved only before reception of cargo on board.
3. Bills of Lading.-COGSA does not unqualifiedly mandate
issuance of bills of lading. Rather, it dictates responsiveness to the
"demand of the shipper" for a bill upon carrier's receipt of goods
and, subsequently, for a "shipped" bill upon completion of lading.76
The status of those bills as documents of title is recognized in a context limiting operation of the Act.7 All bills representing cargoes
outbound from the United States to foreign destinations must state
that they are subject to COGSA. 78 Failure to include the statement,
however, should not deny statutory exceptions from liability.7 9
Under both acts, bills of lading are prima facie evidence of the
carrier's receipt of goods as described.8" Under COGSA, shippers
are explicitly deemed to guarantee accuracy of identifying marks,
count, quantity, and weight data that they supply to carriers. 8 1 Further, shippers must indemnify carriers against losses resulting from
inaccuracies in these particulars.82 Presumably, such losses would be
occasioned by a carrier being held liable to a consignee other than
the shipper. A carrier's right to indemnity from a shipper, however,
does not limit the carrier's liability to a consignee under the affreightment contract.83
Carriers and shippers are at liberty to enter into an agreement
enlarging the carrier's immunities (provided that the basic duty to
use due diligence to achieve seaworthiness is not prejudiced) concerning "particular goods" but no billmay issue and the special terms
must be embodied in a "nonnegotiable document" so marked. 84
COGSA states that "particular goods" are not "ordinary commercial
shipments made in the ordinary course of trade ... .
75. Compare id §§ 190 and 1303(2).
76. Id § 1303(3), (7).
77. Id § 1301(b).
78. Id § 1312. This provision is one of the particulars in which COGSA differs from the
Hague Rules.
79. See, e.g., The Hurry-On (Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co.), 2 D.L.R.
372, 1938 A.M.C. 159 (Can. 1938), rev'd, [1939] A.C. 277, 1939 A.M.C. 257 (Privy Council). A
contrary view holds that use of the Clause Paramount is mandatory (rather than merely directory) and, therefore, a breach should be punished by estopping an offending carrier from
claiming the benefit of COGSA. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 186.
80. 46 U.S.C. §§ 193, 1303(4) (1976).
81. Id § 1303(5).
82. Id
83. Id In the event that a third party (neither carrier nor shipper nor a servant of either)
gauges weight of bulk cargo and the bill so states, it is not prima facie evidence of the weight
against the issuing carrier and the weight is not guaranteed by the shipper. Id § 1310.
84. Id § 1306.
85. Id Presumably, § 1306 does not prohibit use of a shipping document that is in the

4. Carriers'Duties and Liabilities.-In what has been referred
to as the "Heart of COGSA,"86 subsections 3(1) and (2)87 deal primarily with carriers' duties and liabilities while subsection 4(1), (2),
and (4)88 set out exceptions from liability in the style of "Rights and

immunities of carrier and ship."
Taken together, sections 3(1)89 and 4(1)90 obligate carriers to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy for "reception, carriage, and preservation" of cargo 9 but, when loss is caused by actual
unseaworthiness, immunize them from liability at the price of proving due diligence to achieve seaworthiness.9 2 Section 3(2) of the Act
reasserts a duty to use due care with respect to cargo.9 3 If the carrier
proves that one of the perils listed in section 4(2) is the cause-in-fact
of the damage, however, exoneration results. The list includes sixteen inconsistently particularized perils likely to produce cargo damage without carrier fault.9 4 Appended to the list is a catch-all
potentially covering the unanticipated.9 5 The first exception embraces any "[a]ct, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or
the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of
the ship."9 6 This exception is not conditioned upon proof of due
diligence to achieve seaworthiness. The catch-all refers to "[any
other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier
and . . .[its] agents or servants . . . ."' To take advantage of the
form of a bill of lading but prominently legended as nonnegotiable. Since there is a potency to
contractually limit coverage by COGSA, policy demands very strict construction of § 1306.
While the section looks to "shipments where the character or condition of the property. . . or
the circumstances, terms, and conditions under which the carriage is to be performed are such
as reasonably to justify" special arrangement, which seemingly evokes fact findings as to why
and how a transaction normally within the ambit of common carriage is to be insulated from
duties attendant on such carriage, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
...
Tessler Bros.
dismissed § 1306 as concerning "private, as opposed to common, carriage.
Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 1974).
86. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 149.
87. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(1), (2) (1976).
88. Id § 1304(1), (2), (4).
89. Id § 1303(1).
90. Id § 1304(1).
91. Id § 1303(i).
92. Id § 1304(1).
93. Id § 1303(2).
94. Id § 1304(2)(a) to (p).
95. Id § 1304(2)(q).
96. Id § 1304(2)(a). The other fifteen are fire, unless caused by "actual fault or privity of
the carrier;" perils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other navigable water,- acts of God, war,
and public enemies stated separately; arrest or restraint of sovereigns "or people" or seizure
under legal process; quarantine; act or omission of "the shipper or owner of the goods, his
agent or representative;" strikes, lockouts, stoppage or restraint of labor from whatever cause,
whether partial or general; "riots and civil commotions;" attempting to save life or property at
sea; inherent vice of goods; insufficiency of packing; inadequacy of identifying or other appropriate marks on the goods; and latent defects undiscoverable "by due diligence." These parallel the Hague Rules except that the United States modified the "labor dispute" cause by
appending a proviso "[t]hat nothing herein contained shall be construed to relieve a carrier
from responsibility for [its] own acts." Id §§ 1304(2)(b) to (p).
97. Id § 130 4 (2)(q).

catch-all, a carrier must prove not only the extraordinary cause-infact of cargo loss, but also that the loss was not "contributed to" by
either the carrier's "fault or privity" or the "fault or neglect" of its
servants.98
a. Fire.-Fireis one of the sixteen particularized exceptions
unless it is "caused by the actual fault or privily of the carrier." 99
This may seem puzzling since the Fire Statute' ° was specifically
saved from repeal by both Harter' and COGSA. °2 Its inclusion is
explicable, however, because the 1851 statute focused on "owners"', 3
while COGSA more broadly addresses "carriers," including the
owner and
a "charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a
shipper. ' ' °"
b. Delay in delivery.-COGSA deals with delay in a rather oblique fashion. It does not mandate or even mention diligent prosecution of an agreed voyage among the recitation of carriers' duties.
Time is not considered of the essence in contracts of marine affreightment unless the parties so provide. Under the general maritime law, carriers are obligated to prosecute agreed voyages with
"reasonable dispatch."' 5 Of course, neither the general maritime
law nor COGSA precludes a carrier from assuming burdens beyond
those mandated. Therefore, a carrier is free to guarantee time of
arrival or even delivery if the commercial context permits. Ignoring
the potential for a time guaranty, commentators opine that delay is
not actionable (in the sense of a breach of a duty to prosecute a voyage with "reasonable dispatch") unless the slowest anticipated voy06
age time is exceeded negligently.
Section 4(4) of COGSA excuses "reasonable deviations." These
include efforts to save life or property but deviation for the purpose
of loading or discharging passengers or cargo is "prima facie" unreasonable.'0 7 Implicitly, a carrier is liable for damages flowing from
98. See, e.g., The Vizcaya, 63 F. Supp. 898, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1945), af'd sub noma., Beck v.
Vizcaya, 182 F.2d 942 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950). This exception is sometimes
referred to as "the Q clause" or "the COGSA Q clause." For a recent and very rigid address to
"the Q clause," see In re Intercontinental Prop. Mgt. S.A., as owner of M/V Mimi, 604 F.2d
254 (4th Cir. 1979).
99. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
100. Id § 182.
101. Id § 196.
102. Id § 1308.
103. Id § 182. It must be noted, however, that the broader Limitation of Shipowner's
Liability Act equates demise charterers with owners. Id § 186.
104. Id § 1301(a). In this context, "charterer" seems to include not only demise charterers but also time charterers and voyage charterers.
105. The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858) (dicta). See generally A.
KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 261-65; A. MOCATrA supra note 6, at 88-90.
106. A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 263.

107.

46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1976).

unreasonable deviation. Deviation is normally considered departure
from an agreed course or, in the absence of agreement, the normal
route. 108 Delay is not necessarily a consequence of or attributable to
deviation. Delay, however, is among the consequences one might
expect from physical deviation. Before statutory address, deviation
was thought to deprive a carrier of the benefit of any contractual
exceptions, 10 9 which, in effect, reinstated the insurer concept.
COGSA exemplifies the rationale that a carrier's deviations will be
excused only if associated with the public good or, at least, unassociated with the achievement of objectives inimical to the common venture as represented to shippers. In any event, COGSA does not treat
"delay" as a discrete problem.
5. Insuranceand GeneralAverage.-As remarked earlier, both
Harter and COGSA void covenants purporting to relieve carrier or
vessel from liability for cargo loss occasioned by neglect, fault, or
failure in observing minimal duties owed cargo."' COGSA, however, added the sophistication that a carrier's exaction of what
amounts to an assignment of the benefit of shipper's insurance is
deemed .to be such a prohibited clause."'
Yet, COGSA is far friendlier to another insurance concept
favoring carriers. Section 5 validates "insertion in a bill. . . of any
lawful provision regarding general average."" 12 General average is a
creature of the general maritime law." 3 It can be roughly analogized to mutual insurance of those interests committed to survival of
the vessel and its cargo. It contemplates that, if part of the physical
property actually included in the voyage is sacrificed in a successful
effort to avoid substantial peril to the venture's survival,"1 4 those entitled to the surviving property (vessel, freight uncollected at the time
of the peril, and cargo) and those who owned the sacrificed property
will share the expense of the sacrifice on bases prorated by reference
to the values of sacrificed and surviving interests." 5 The purpose is
to assure owners of sacrificed property that they will fare no worse,
economically, than owners of surviving property served by the sacrifice. The general maritime law denied the carrier's right to general
108. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 177. The term "deviation," however, is
also applied to other departures by carriers from the path of duty explicit or implicit in the
contract of carriage. Thus, stowage of goods on weather decks has been so characterized when
stowage below decks was called for by contract or usage. Seabroad Shipping Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966).
109.

G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 176-77.

110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

46 U.S.C. §§ 190, 191, 1303(8) (1976).
Id § 1303(8).
Id § 1305.
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 244-71.
Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270, 303 (1850).
Pacific Freighters Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir.

1940).

average contribution from cargo if the peril arose through fault in
vessel operation." 6 In the wake of the enactment of the Hater Act,
the Supreme Court validated stipulations in bills that effectively reverse the general maritime law principle by entitling a carrier to general average contributions although the peril provoking sacrifice of
cargo was the product of negligence in vessel operation." 7 Thus, a
contractual provision is permitted to imbue a statutory shield with
all the potency of a sword. In effect, Section 5 reaffirms consistency
of such provisions with public policy." 8
6 Timeliness ofAction andLimitation on Damages.-- COGSA
also addresses the timely presentation and prosecution of cargo
claims and places a quantitative limit on carrier liability.
Removal, by authorized recipients, of cargo from carrier custody at discharge port is prima facie evidence of delivery of goods as
described in the bill unless written notice of loss or damage is given
no later than the time of removal. "9 "If the loss or damage is not
apparent, the notice must be given within three days of delivery."' 2
In case of actual or "apprehended" loss, carrier and receiver are to
afford "reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying
the goods."'' Notice is dispensable "if the state of the goods. . . at
. . .receipt" was the subject of "joint survey or inspection."' 2 2 Unless that survey was conducted by an agreed neutral party, or the
product of a joint survey was immediately reduced to writing, cargo
interests are well advised to give timely and particularized written
notice. Failure to give timely and informative written notice, however, does not strip cargo interests of a cause of action. Rather, they
become burdened with proving that the claimed loss did not occur
after removal from carrier custody.' 23 In context of the common
116. The Irrawaddy, 171 U.S. 187 (1898).
117. The Jason, 225 U.S. 32 (1912).
118. Note the potential for conflict between precedent and commercial desires concerning
the role of danger in recognizing a general average situation. As Scrutton speaks to the law,
"There must be a common danger, which must be real, and not merely apprehended by the
master, however reasonable." A. MOCATTA supra note 6, at 274; Ravenscroft v. United States,
1936 A.M.C. 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1936), af'd, 88 F.2d 418 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 301 U.S. 707
(1937). However, the York-Antwerp Rules 1974 (product of private organizations with multinational membership), which are often incorporated in whole or in part by contracts of
marine affreightment, key on sacrifices "reasonaby made.., for the common safety for the
purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure." 2
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 181 (7th ed. rev. 1975). Assuming incorporation of this language
in a carriage contract as definitive of a general average situation, does COGSA (46 U.S.C.
§ 1305) accept or reject the master's reasonable perception of danger when it proves that there
was no danger? Seemingly, there should be no great policy problem in permitting Rule A to
prevail if the parties adopt it since it is no more objectionable than a "Jason clause."
119. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1976).
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id
123. A. KNAOTH, supra note 5, at 273-74.

American approach to statutes of limitation, the time bar in COGSA
is curiously phrased. It discharges both carrier and vessel from liability unless suit is commenced within a year from delivery "or the
date when the goods should have been delivered."' 2 4
Limitations on the amount of carrier liability are always troublesome in common carriage. The problem has intensified in the age
of containerization and intermodal transportation. 25 COGSA set a
consensually irreducible limitation of carrier liability at $500 per
package or "customary freight unit"'' 26 unless and to the extent a
higher value appears on the bill. 127 Recitation of a value in excess of
$500 per unit on the face of a bill is prima facie evidence of the
greater value. 28 Significance of the irreducibility of the $500 per
unit limit is modified by restricting carrier liability to actual damage.' 2 9 In addition, COGSA purports to exonerate the carrier from
cargo losses when the "nature or value" of the cargo was "knowingly
and fraudulently misstated by the shipper in the bill . . ,, 130
Conceptually linked to these exonerations is leave for carriers to
land "at any place" or destroy inflammable, explosive, or otherwise
dangerous goods when "shipment" was effected without the carrier's
informed consent. This leave includes measures to allay the danger
without landing or destruction. In event of a carrier taking proper
advantage of this leave, no compensation is due cargo interests and
the shipper is liable for all resulting damages and expenses.13' Even
more remarkable is leave to land, destroy, or disarm such shipments
that "become a danger to. . . ship or cargo" even though the goods
were received by the carrier with knowledge of the implicit threat.
In this event, the shipper is not explicitly burdened with liability but
32
the carrier is exonerated from liability except in general average.
III.
A.

The Hamburg Rules
Apparent Rationale

The expressed rationale for formulation of the Hamburg Rules
is a "belief that the operation of traditional maritime law (along with
124. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1976).
125. See, e.g., Wirth Ltd. v. The Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1976); Leather's
Best, Inc. v. The Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 6, at 191-92; N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, supra note 6, at 549-50.
126. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976).
127. Id
128. Id
129. Id
130. Id Quite apart from COGSA, another statute releases carriers from responsibility for
named classes of highly valued goods if their nature is undisclosed even though no fraudulent
element is present. Id § 181.
131. Id § 1304(6).
132. Id (emphasis added).

other aspects of international trade law) impairs the balance of payment position of developing states so as to contribute to continued
poverty and under-development in an industrial age."' 133 As more
particularly expressed, "[A]llocation of risks in the Hague Rules is
already slanted too much in favor of carriers while the further protection of the Hague Rules unit limitation of liability together with
the possibility of over-all limitation of shipowner liability tips the
balance so much in the shipowner's favor that it must necessarily
have affected the cost of insurance, although no compensation is
given by way of lower freight rates for shippers."' 34 The authors of
this article do not address the rationality of these reported conclusions, being content to accept the quoted language as a fair commentary on pressures experienced by those responsible for the Hamburg
formulations. By the same token, the authors feel no burden to belabor the self-evident theses that vessel operators are as active buyers
in insurance markets as shippers and that carriers' underwriters will
not absorb the costs implicit in writing expanded coverage. One
might project that, if the HamburgRules are accepted by most significant trading nations, frustration of rising expectations entertained
by the Rules' proponents will lead to a discovery that there is need
for supranational regulation of marine underwriters who will be
characterized as having "caused" a general increase in freight rates.
The M.L.A. Committee on Bills of Lading neither reflected any
great sympathy for nor vigorously attacked the sensations of injustice said to predicate proposal of the Hamburg Rules. Rather, the
Committee dryly reported an "understanding. . . that the commercial interests in the United States, i.e., cargo owning interests, ship
owning interests and the insurers of both, do not share" the proponents' view.' 35 In addition, the Committee reported an opinion'36
that the Rules would lead to "decreased efficiency in. . . processing
• . . claims for cargo loss. . . and therefore in increased cost to consumers." Moving from a pragmatic recognition that the Rules would
not reduce incidence of cargo loss, the Committee suggested that the
real effect would be to transfer claims handling and premium vol38 Imume from cargo underwriters to carriers' "P & I""' insurers.
133. REPORT, supra note 16, at para. 46.
134. These views are attributed to "developing countries." Id. The Report notes, however, that the "developing countries" normally identified with the "Group of 77" in other
United Nations actions were far from monolithic at Hamburg. Id at paras. 13, 24. The
"cargo owning viewpoints were normally supported by Australia, Canada, France, and the
United States." Id at para. 24. How does this square with the quoted rhetoric?
135. M.L.A. doc. no. 618, supra note 22, at 7023.
136. Id at 7027-28. Two of the forty-nine listed members abstained from the opinion.
The dissenters were Professors J. Sweeney and John Hunnold, United States "Representative"
and "Alternate Representative" to the Hamburg Conference.
137. For a summary introduction to "Protection & Indemnity" insurance, see N. HEALY &
D. SHARPE, supra note 6, at 652-53.
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M.L.A. doc. no. 618, supra note 22, at 7023.

plicit in this switch would be considerable time and monetary costs
in adjusting to new rules that, almost by definition, would necessitate
considerable litigation.' 3 9 The Committee restrained itself from
making the trite but all too often true observation that the sole beneficiaries would be the lawyers of all countries involved.
While the Committee cannot be described as recommending
American adoption of the Rules, there is some disinclination to emulate Canute if world opinion strongly supports the Rules. If the Rules
are adopted by a sufficient number of United States trading partners
to threaten unproductive conflicts, the Committee would recommend
following suit.'o Presumably, to the degree parallel groups in other
countries feel similarly, the undeniable fact of the United States' signature is unfortunately susceptible of being cited as an informed endorsement of the Rules despite the pecularity attending the
signature.
Instinctively, the first reaction is to inquire to what degree the
Hamburg Rules are comparable to the "heart of COGSA."' 4 Address to carrier duties and liabilities, however, would be inappropriate and somewhat insensible without initial attendance to the
intended scope of the Rules' application.
B.

Coverage

The Rules charge water carriers with responsibility for cargo
during whatever temporal period in which they are literally "in
charge of the goods."' 4 2 Thus, an analogue to Harter rather than
COGSA appears. Unlike Harter or COGSA, however, "goods" are
defined to include live animals.'4 3 Like Harter, the Rules also include deck cargo. Indeed, deck cargo and animals are dealt with at
length in the Rules' address to carriers' duties.'
A modem twist,
and a bow to containerization, is supplied by providing that "where
the goods are consolidated in a container, pallet or similar article of
transport or where they are packed, 'goods' includes such article...
45
or packaging tf supplied by the shipper." 1
A "contract of carriage by sea" is defined as "any contract
whereby" a carrier undertakes carriage by sea "against payment of
freight . . . from one port to another.'"
Note that this omits a fo139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id at 7024.
Id at 7025.
See text accompanying notes 86-109, supra.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 4(1) (1978).
Id at art. 1(5).
Id at arts. 5(5), 9.
Id at art. 1(5) (emphasis supplied).
Id at art.
1(6).

cus on bills of lading per se or the role of a "document of title."' 147
The Rules, however, are explicitly inapplicable to "charter-parties." ' 48 Reference to carriage forpayment is a novelty.
A bill issued pursuant to a charter is subject to the Rules only
"if it governs the relation between the carrier and the holder. . . not
being the charterer." 149 A contract for multimodal carriage is
deemed a contract for water carriage "only in so far as it relates to
the carriage by sea." This may present a difficulty when contestants
argue about a carrier's shoreside custodial duties for intermodal
50
cargo.'
Definitional focus on transit "from one port to another"' 51
might provoke the idea that the Rules apply to purely domestic carriage that is accomplished on a leg in an international voyage involving several ports of call. It is clear that no domestic application is
intended although, to be sure, no nation is precluded from adaptation to domestic trades. The Rules explicitly apply to international
carriage "by sea" #/(a) agreed loading or discharge port is in a "contracting state"; (b) an agreed but optional port of discharge is in a
"contracting state" and is actually used; (c) bills or equivalent documentation issue in a "contracting state"; or (d) bills or equivalent
documentation incorporate either the Rules proper or the "legislation" of a contracting state.' 5 2 Thus, ignoring the optional port feature, applicability of the Rules is tested by the intended voyage rather
than actual carriage. The reference to optional ports, however, introduces a most curious mechanism because recognition of applicable law will be postponed until discharge at an "optional" port. 5
147. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1976) (COGSA applies to "contracts of carriage cov). "Bill of lading" is defined in
ered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title .
the Rules as
a document which evidences a contract of carriage by sea and the taking over or
loading of the goods by the carrier, and by which the carrier undertakes to deliver the
goods against surrender of the document. A provision in the document that the
goods are to be delivered to the order of a named person, or to other, or to bearer,
constitutes such an undertaking.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 1(7) (1978). The Report of the United States Delegation to the Hamburg Conference contains the somewhat curious amplification:
The definition. . . thereby omits the order or straight bill still found in this country.
Under the Hamburg Rules, all 'bills of lading' are negotiable. Nevertheless, straight
bills may still be found under Article 18 [of the Rules] as 'Documents other than bills
of lading.' This may prove adequate to the problem.
REPORT, supra note 16, at para. 66(3). Compare §§ 2 and 3 of the Pomerene Act, 49 U.S.C.
82, 83 (1976).
148. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 2(3) (1978).
149. Id
150. Id at art. 1(6) (emphasis supplied). The Report of the United States Delegation to
the Hamburg Conference, which states that the Rules "are not a multi-modal treaty," recognizes that there is danger to cargo interests "in attempting to push the maritime regime too far
ashore" and that use of the word "port" in the definition of carrier in article 4(1) is restrictive.
REPORT,

151.
152.
153.

supra note 16, at para. 65.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 1(6) (1978).
Id at art. 2(1).
See, e.g., A. MOCATrA, supra note 5, at 451-52, (commentary on the United King-

Presumably, if a port in which the Rules were in effect was an optional place of discharge but cargo was discharged in a noncontracting state and the unused optional port was the only point of contact
linking the transaction as a whole to the Rules, a court in a "contracting state" is not to opine that the Rules are applicable exproprio
vigore. Multinational recognition of conflicts of law principles154being
what it is, this presumption lacks a high degree of certainty.
C. Carriers'Duties and Liabilities
Assuming applicability of the Hamburg Rules and looking to
the bases of carrier liability, three things immediately draw attention: "delay in delivery" is equated with "loss of or damage to"
goods in terms of carrier liability; 155 there is no shopping list of exceptions from carrier responsibility, a la the Hague Rules and
COGSA;156 and insulation afforded owners and demise charterers by
the United States Fire Statute, ' and carriers by its counterpart in
COGSA,' 5 8 would be nonexistent or, at least, considerably reduced. 5 9
In general terms, a carrier is liable for delays in delivery of, loss
of, or damage to goods if the causative "occurrence. . . took place
while the goods were in his charge. . . unless the carrier proves that
he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be
requiredto avoid the occurrence and its consequences."1 60 Annexed
to the Rules is a statement of "common understanding that the liability of the carrier under this Convention is based on the principle
proof
of presumed fault or neglect. . . . [A]s a rule, the burden 16of
1
rests on the carrier . . ." except as modified by the Rules.
Happily, "delay" is defined by the Rules. 162 Unfortunately, the
manner of definition is likely to produce significant litigation. The
definition focuses on failure to deliver at intended discharge port
"within the time expressly agreed upon or, in the absence of such
agreement, within the time which it would be reasonable to require
of a diligent carrier, having regard to the circumstances of the
dom's Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971). Excepting the optional port feature, the Hamburg
Rules closely approximate the Visby Amendment's approach to application.
154. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 186 (1962).
155. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 5(1) (1978).
156. 46 U.S.C. §§ 192, 1304(2) (1976).
157. See text accompanying notes 33-34, supra. The Report of the United States Delegation to the Hamburg Conference does not appear to recognize implications for the Fire Statute
per se.
158. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
159. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 5(3) (1978).
160. Id at art. 5(1) (emphasis supplied).
161. Id, Annex II.
162. Id, Annex I at art. 5(2).

case." 1 63 Explicit provision of a rule addressing failure to meet an
agreed time schedule is not shocking since there is no compulsion for
carriers to make such commitments.
Nevertheless, in the absence of such commitment, this address
to the diligent carrier and what may be reasonably demanded will
prove troublesome to plaintiffs and fact finders. Note that, despite
what has become a traditional and understandable placement of the
burden to prove availability of exceptions on carriers, 64 those prosecuting cargo interests must prove the fact of unreasonable delay in
their case-in-chief.165 Since the Hamburg Rules also express what
has become the traditional principle of voiding contractual provisions designed to minimize carrier liability, 6 6 there is potency for
considerable litigious debate about efficacy of contractual stipulations concerning what constitutes carrier diligence and what "circumstances" are to be considered. It is rather easy to conceive of
stipulations designed, say, to mandate carriers' contemporary reports
concerning delaying circumstances and, of course, making such reports well nigh conclusive.
Another use of the delay concept exists independently of the
address to damages inflicted by unreasonable delay. If goods are
undelivered "within 60 consecutive days following the expiry of the
time for delivery," cargo interests "entitled to make a claim for the
loss of goods may treat the goods as lost."' 67 By definition, plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the "time for delivery" essential to this
constructive loss concept. This, absent specific agreement, may lead
to the diligence formulae remarked earlier. 68 The Rules, however,
do not explicitly link the provisions for gauging delay in delivery
actionable in itself' 69 with the "expiry" of delivery time necessary to
trigger the constructive loss calculation. 7 0 Thus, if to their advantage in a given situation, carriers will argue that the general maritime
law methodology' 7 ' is entirely appropriate to fixing "expiry of the
time of delivery" for purposes of recognizing a delay-induced constructive loss. Whether this line of argument is necessary in a practical context will key on two factors: whether cargo interests invoke,
and courts uphold, constructive loss when goods are made available
after expiry of the sixty days but before commencement of litigation;
and the attitude of the forum toward cargo interests' duty to assist in
163.

Id (emphasis supplied).

164.

G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 183-85.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 5(1), (2) (1978).
Id at art. 23.
Id at art. 5(3).
See text at note 163 supra.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 5(l) (1978).
Id at art. 5(3).
See text at note 106, supra.

mitigation of damages by acceptance of even grossly delayed goods
tendered before entry of judgment. Presumably, even a forum well
disposed to carriers would be reluctant to mandate what amounts to
an annulment of a delay-induced constructive loss if cargo interests
had effected a substantial change of position in reliance on the
"loss." Hence, in a case in which delivery is effected a few business
days after that upon which cargo interests believe the sixty days expired, a carrier may be quite anxious to fix the "expiry" date by reference to what amounts to the slowest common voyage time. This
172
anxiety may be well served by general maritime law precedents.
1. Duty of Diligence.-A leading commentator described
COGSA as operating "to exonerate the carrier unless due diligence
has not been used in some respect proximately causing or contributing to the loss.' 1 73 Of course, this assumes the absence of an agreement for greater care. Subject to the same assumption, the Hamburg
Rules go much further. With few exceptions, 174 the Rules effectively
characterize a carrier as a guarantor of safe and timely delivery unless it can prove a high degree of diligence (i.e., "all measures...
reasonably. . . required") on its part and the part of its servants to
avoid the occasion of loss and its consequences. 7 5 This provision
negates the exception from vicarious liability for errors in vessel
management and navigation that are common to Harter and
COGSA. This is accentuated by the fact that the basic responsibility
under the Hamburg Rules can be parsed to hold a carrier liable for
untoward consequences experienced by cargo even though neither
the carrier nor its servants were responsible for the initially efficient
causative element.' 76 Note that the Rules also elide substitution of
due diligence to achieve seaworthiness for the general maritime law
warranty of seaworthiness hitherto effected by Harter and
COGSA. 177 Would United States adoption of the Hamburg Rules
172.
173.

See, e.g., A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 263:
Id at 168.

174.

Some relaxation is evident in the cases of live animals, cargo explicitly scheduled for

stowage on weather decks, and dangerous cargoes. See text accompanying notes 185-86 and
199-208 infra.
175. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 5(1) (1978). Annex II to the Final Act of
the Hamburg Conference reports a "common understanding that the liability of the carrier
under this Convention is based on the principle of presumed fault or neglect. This means that,

as a rule, the burden of proof rests on the carrier but, with respect to certain cases, the provisions of the Convention modify this rule." Id at Annex II.
176. Much will depend on the weight courts accord to the conjunction in "to avoid the
occurrence and its consequences." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 5(1) (1978).
177. The Report of the United States Delegation states:
IT]he complex carrier warranty of seaworthiness before and at the beginning of the

voyage. . . is suppressed along with the entire list of defenses in Article IV (2)(a)-(g)
of the Hague Rules. [Tihe carrier must prove non-fault . . . .Thus, there will be
factual defenses of superior natural forces, superior human forces and the contribu-

tory faults of the shipper. Missing, however, is the defense of negligent navigation
and management. . . . Article 5 represents the present attitude of United States

resurrect the warranty of seaworthiness?
2. Fire and Salvage Provisions.-While omission of what has
become a traditional exception for errors in vessel navigation and
management (as opposed to failure in care of cargo) 1 78 is quite notable, the approach of the Hamburg Rules to fire is even more revealing of the spirit promoting the total proposal. While COGSA
places the burden of proving the availability of the fire exception on
the affected carrier and effectively relieves carriers from accountabil179
ity for undirected acts and neglects of vessel operating personnel,
the Rules would change the situation considerably. Article 5(4)(a) of
the Rules provides:
The carrier is liable (i) for loss of or damage to . . . or delay in
delivery [of the goods] caused by fire, if the claimantproves that
the fire arose from fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his
servants or agents [or] (ii) for such loss . . proved by the claimant
to have resulted from the fault or neglect of the carrier, his servants or agents, in taking all measures that could reasonably be
required 8to
0 put out the fire and avoid or mitigate its consequences.1
Thus, at the cost of carrying the burden of proof, cargo claimants
gain the benefit of not only respondeat superior but an ability to
recover for retrospectively evaluated fire-fighting beyond the carrier's personal control even though neither it nor any of its servants
is responsible for the cause of the fire. This invites unpressured judicial scrutiny of the wisdom of those who really addressed the horror
of fire at sea.
Another part of Article 5(4) is of potentially great assistance to
claimants. At the instance of either claimant or carrier, subsection
(b) would mandate examination by marine surveyors "into the cause
and circumstances of" fire "affecting the goods," with copies of the
ultimate reports to be given to the parties. 18 The phrase "affecting
the goods" seems broad enough to include not only those subjects of
cargo claims recited in Article 5(4)(a) but also separate subjects such
as general average and salvage liabilities. The Rules are silent concerning the source of payment for this survey. This silence creates
various potencies. These include an attempt by carriers not only to
Courts to cargo damage cases, regardless of the statutory language from COGSA or
the Harter Act in which the Jaw is embodied.
REPORT, supra note 16, at para. 63 (emphasis added). The authors merely report the attitude
of the draftsman of the United States delegation and do not endorse it.
178. The distinction is frequently disturbing since essentially the same acts or omissions of
vessel personnel may be characterized as liability-inducing failure in care of cargo or exception-availing error in management according to a fact finder's view of said personnel's purpose
in acting or failure to act. N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, supra note 6, at 485-86.
179. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
180. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 5.4(a) (1978) (emphasis added).
181. Id at art. 5.4(b).

burden cargo interests with the costs of surveys requested by cargo
claimants but also to treat such costs as added freight to be paid
before release of surviving cargo.
Having remarked the omission of traditional exceptions for error in vessel operation and for fire, it is appropriate to note a partially surviving exception. Carriers will not be liable "except in
general average" for loss, damage, or delay resulting "from measures
to save life or from reasonable measures to save property at sea."18' 2
This provision differs in nuance from COGSA which does not make
the distinction implicit in the use of the word "reasonable." Similar
to the approach to fire-fighting that is adopted in the Rules, this difference sets the stage for retrospective unpressured-judgments of the
propriety of measures taken under great psychological stress.
Presumably, carriers and their underwriters will not be delighted by the prospect of having landsmen make fact findings about
reasonability of fire-fighting or other extraordinary tasks undertaken
by seagoing personnel. The exceptions permitted by Harter and
COGSA give carriers the benefit of the doubt concerning the reasonability of vessel personnel's reactions to danger. Fire aboard ship is
at least as threatening to those aboard her as it is to cargo. A policy
bias toward honoring the judgments of those so threatened is not
beyond the pale. Although it is important to encourage efforts to
save property at sea, there is a substantial difference between life and
property in terms of a hierarchy of values.
Not decidedly unfavorable to carriers is the provision that,
when cargo is delayed or sustains loss through a concurrence of
causes of which one is attributable to carrier personnel, the carrier is
liable only to the extent that fault or neglect of its personnel was
causative.' 8 3 This provision is more favorable than the American
version of the general maritime law. To achieve the benefit of this
version of comparative fault, a carrier has the burden of proving
84
"the amount" not attributable to its servants' acts or omissions.
3. Live Animals.-As remarked earlier, the Hamburg Rules
differ from COGSA by including live animals and deck cargo within
the projected class of cargo. Each of these varieties of cargo is given
careful treatment in recognition of the special problems it presents.
Carriers will not be liable for the consequences of "special
risks" inherent in carrying live animals. 85 Those risks are not de182.
183.
184.
Annex
(Harter
185.

Id at art. 5(6) (emphasis added).
Id at art. 5(7).
Id This would appear to be consistent with the philosophy implicit in art. 5() and
II of the Hamburg Rules. See also Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 (1934)
Act decision).
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 5(5) (1978).

fined, but some are easily imaginable; for example, emotional and
physical susceptibility to environmental variations and vessel motion. If a carrier proves compliance with "special instructions given
to him by the shipper. . . and . . . in the circumstances of the case,
the loss. . . could be attributed to such risks," loss will be presumed
to be "so caused, unless there is proof" that loss flowed from fault or
neglect of carrier personnel.' 86 This phraseology concerning proof is
curious. Carriers predictably and not unreasonably will take the position that proof of carrier personnel's failure is a burden for cargo
interest. It is worthy of note that a shipper's attempt to provide "special instructions" will be an opportunity for very careful negotiation.
4. Limitation on Damages.-- Quantified limits of carrier liability are addressed on three levels. Loss of or injury to goods is addressed both separately from delay in delivery and, in terms of an
aggregate exposure, in connection with it. 187 Keyed on specified
rates of "units of account"' 8 8 and "monetary units" (distinct from
but exchangeable into national currencies)' 8 9 as limits of carrier liability for loss or injury per package or customary shipping unit or
kilogram of gross weight,' 9 ° the Rules also address the container
phenomenon on what seems a very workmanlike basis.
(a) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used
to consolidate goods, the package or other shipping units enumerated in the bill of lading, if issued, or otherwise in any other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea, as packed in such
article of transport are deemed packages or shipping units. Except
as aforesaidthe goods in such article of transport are deemed one
shipping unit.
(b) In cases where the article of transport itself has been lost
or damaged, [it] if not owned or otherwise supplied by the carrier
is considered one separate shipping unit.' 9 '
Therefore, absent enumeration of shipping units within a container
or on a pallet, the maximum cargo claim is for one package unless
the shipper caused supply of the container in which event it is for
two. However, if a proper enumeration was documented, it will
speak for itself subject to addition of a unit for containers not supplied by the carrier.
What, then, are the limitation formulae? Since units of account
are keyed to IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR's), 192 a somewhat
clearer picture is obtained by focusing on "monetary units," which
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

(emphasis added).
at art. 6.
at art. 6(l)(a).
at art. 26(2),(3).
at art. 6(l)(a).
at art. 6(2) (emphasis added).
at art. 26(1).

equate to 65.6 milligrams of .900 gold per unit.' 9 3 For loss or injury,
the limitation on damages is the higher of (a) 835 units of account
(12,500 monetary units) per shipping unit or (b) 2.5 units of account
(37.5 monetary units) 9 4 per "kilogramme of gross weight" of affected goods. Liability for delay is limited to "two and a half times
the freightpayable for the goods delayed. . . not exceeding the total
freight payable under the contract of carriage of goods by sea."' 95
Damages payable for loss or injury are added to those for delay with
an arbitrary ceiling imposed by reference to what would be payable
for total loss of the goods.' 9 6 These limits apply throughout the carrier's control of the goods.' 97 Utility of a scheme keyed to one commodity (in this case, gold) is always dubious but one assumes that
nonmembership in IMF leads to suspicion of SDR's.
Availability of these quantified limitations of liability is not absolute. Cargo claimants are invited to prove that the loss, injury, or
delay "resulted from an act or omission . . . done with the intent to
cause such [condition], or recklessly and with knowledge that such
Since "reckless" is not de[condition] would probably result."'
fined, there is a potential for divergent applications among nations,
but the process appears otherwise unexceptionable.
5. Deck Cargo.-The detailed attention given by the Rules to
duties implicit in accepting and carrying deck cargo is explicitly
keyed to potencies for loss of carrier ability to effect an overall quantified limitation on liability. A carrier can licitly carry cargo on deck
pursuant to agreement with its shipper or "the usage of the particular
trade" or government rule.' 99 Absent written recognition of permissibility of deck lading in the contract of carriage, the carrier has the
burden of proving shipper's agreement. The carrier cannot, however, invoke this permission against one who has innocently acquired a bill of lading that does not declare for deck stowage. 2"
Inability to interpose the shipper's permission off the face of a bill
disturbs the authors in at least the contexts of trade usage permitting
stowage on deck and containerization. It would seem that, in either
193. Id at art. 26(3). Provision is made for later conferences to revise conversion rates.
Id at art. 33.
194. Id at art. 6(i)(a). The Report of the United States Delegation to the Hamburg Conference maintains that delay-induced physical deterioration of goods is to be subject to the
limit provided by art. 6(l)(a). REPORT, supra note 16, at para. 52.
195. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 6(l)(b) (1978) (emphasis added). The Report of the United States Delegation to the Hamburg Conference maintains that this limitation
is applicable to delay-induced economic losses whereas art. 6(l)(a) addresses delay-induced
physical deterioration of goods. REPORT, supra note 16, at para. 52.
196. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 6(l)(c) (1978).
197. Id at art. 4(l).
198. Id at art. 8(l) (emphasis added).
199. Id at art. 9(1).
200. Id at art. 9(2).

case, there should be little chance of minimally sophisticated third
parties being deceived.
When a carrier cannot rely on an agreement or other permission
for carriage on deck, it becomes an insurer because it is liable for all
damages "resulting solely from the carriage on deck. .. 20 In
other words, impermissible deck storage denies availability of a "due
diligence" defense. The monetary limits on damages are still applicable but they may be set aside if goods are carried "on deck con20 2
trary to express agreement" that they will be stowed under deck.
6. Dangerous Goods.-Dangerous goods are treated under the
broad caption of "Liability of the Shipper." After restating a broad
immunity for shippers from liability to carriers in the absence of
shippers' faults or neglects, 20 3 the Rules speak to "Special rules on
dangerous goods." Since these rules involve exonerations for carrier
conduct in a certain context, they are treated here.
Shippers must label dangerous goods in a manner suitable to
disclosing the danger.2 ' Beyond this, a shipper must inform a carrier of the goods "dangerous character" and, "if necessary, of the
precautions to be taken." If the shipper fails to communicate that
data and the carrier is ignorant of the character of the goods, not
only is the shipper liable for any loss "resulting from the shipment"
but the carrier is entitled to offload, destroy, or render the goods "innocuous" without obligation to the shipper.20 5 Note the unfortunate
rhetorical difference from COGSA, which gives the same discretion
to a carrier if its knowing consent was not procured by the shipper.20 6
Hopefully, courts will gravitate toward a construction paralleling
COGSA. Another difference from COGSA is apparent in the context of a carrier having knowingly accepted dangerous cargo that becomes imminently threatening. While COGSA permits a carrier to
indulge allaying steps without liability save in general average, the
Hamburg Rules expose the carrier to not only general average but
201. Id at art. 9(3). The carrier is liable notwithstanding liability to prove that "all measures . . . to avoid" the causative occurrence were taken. Id at art. 5(1).
202. Id at art. 9(3),(4). It must be remembered that COGSA explicitly avoids application
to cargo scheduled for carriage on weather decks. See text accompanying notes 56-62, supra.
COGSA is consistent with art. I(c) of the Hague Rules. A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 41. The
Report of the United States Delegation to the Hamburg Conference observes that article 9 of
the Hamburg Rules "does not represent a change of law in the general provisions of 9(1)
through 9(3) .. " Further,
[Article] 9(4), with its provision for carrier liability for full damages not subject to the
Article 6 unit limitation restores the essence of the American case law which holds
such shipment to be a deviation ousting the bill of lading thereby subjecting the carrier
to full damages under the general maritime law.
REPORT, supra note 16, at para. 57 (emphasis added).
203. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 12 (1978).
204. Id at art. 13(1).
205. Id at art. 13(2).
206. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(6) (1976).

also liability for having failed to take "all measures . . reasonably
. . .required to avoid the occurence and its consequences. "207 Thus,
the Rules again invite pressure-free retrospection about decisions
made by seamen under stress, which opportunity COGSA does not
afford on an explicit level.2 °8
D.

Transport Documents

Little has been said of bills of lading and other manifestations
of contracts of marine affreightment under the Hamburg Rules. The
basic orientation of the Rules is to "any contract. . . to carry goods
by sea . . "209
The role of a bill of lading as a document of title is ignored on an
explicit level. The bill is defined as "a document which evidences a
contract of carriage by sea and the taking over. . . of the goods by
the carrier, and by which the carrier undertakes to deliver . . .
against surrender of the document. '210° There is no narrow focus on
bills or, in the words of COGSA, similar documents of title. 2 1'
The Rules apply to any "contract of carriage by sea. "1212 If a
single contract contemplates a series of shipments, the Rules apply to
each shipment.2 13 If a carrier evidences receipt of goods with "a document other than a bill of lading," then "such a document is prima
facie evidence of the conclusion of the contract of carriage .... 214
Nevertheless, bills of lading are not consigned to the roles of
curious anachronisms. Similar to COGSA, appropriate bills must
issue on the demands of shippers.2 5 The Rules spell out minimum
content of bills2" 6 including statements concerning freight payable
207. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 13(4) (1978).
208. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(6) (1976).
209. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 1(6) (1978).
210. Id at art. 1(7) (emphasis added).
211. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300, 1301(b), 1312 (1976).
212. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 1(6) (1978).
213. Id at art. 2(4).
214. Id at art. 18.
215. Id at arts. 14(1), 15(2).
216. These include many usual terms: general nature of goods; identification marks; explicit statement as to danger, if any; number of packages or pieces; weight or quantity otherwise expressed; apparent condition of goods; carrier's name and principal place of business;
name of shipper; consignee, if named; loading port and date goods "were taken over" by carriers at said port; port of discharge from the voyage; number of original bills if more than one;
place of bill's issuance; signature of person acting on behalf of carrier; statement, if such is the
case, that the goods shall or may be carried on deck; any increases in carriers' maximum
liability as quantified by the Rules; and, a suitable Clause Paramount advising all concerned
with the bill of the applicability of the Rules. Id at art. 15(I). If a "shipped" bill issues, it must
state not only the foregoing but also that goods are on board a named vessel and date of
loading. Id at art. 15(2). The Report of the United States Delegation to the Hamburg Conference refers to the "excessive list of mandatory requirements for bills of lading" as among "Mischevious Provisions of the Hamburg Rules." REPORT, supra note 16, at para. 66(6) (emphasis
added).

"by consignee,"2'17 timing of delivery tf expressly agreed, 2 18 and res21 9
ervations concerning accuracy of "particulars" of the goods.
Agreement that cargo will or can be carried on deck must be disclosed on the bill.2 2°
A shipper is "deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the accuracy of particulars. . . furnished by him for insertion in the bill of
lading."' 22 ' Indemnity provisions 22 basically parallel those of
COGSA 223 in a like context. The Hamburg Rules, however, go further and address the hopefully rare situation in which a carrier "or
the person acting on his behalf" intends to defraud a third party,
including a consignee, by issuance of bills lacking an appropriate
reservation as to particulars supplied by a shipper. Intentional omission of an appropriate reservation denies not only a right to indemnity 224 but ability to rely on the overall limitation of liability for
losses sustained by the third party in question.22 5
Except for particulars to which the carrier has properly endorsed bills reflecting its suspicions of inaccuracies or inability to
verify226 and explicitly endorsed reservations about the condition of
goods,22 7 issued bills are prima facie evidence of the receipt (and, in
the case of a "shipped" bill, lading) of goods 2 28 in apparent good
condition.2 2 9 Once a carrier has issued clean bills, he is absolutely
barred from asserting nonreceipt (or nonlading) of goods of the
quality and quantity in question against an innocent third party
transferee who relied on the bills.23 ° Similarly, failure of a bill to
spell out freight or loading port demurrage payable by a consignee is
prima facie evidence that those items are not owed. A carrier is
barred from rebutting this presumption in the face of a claim by an
innocent third party transferee who relied on the absence of any indication of demurrage or freight owing. 23 ' The authors, not admir217. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 15(1)(k) (1978). Because of another provision of the Rules, it would be prudent to state unpaid loading port demurrage. Id at art. 16(4).
218. Id at art. 15(l)(n).
219. Id at art. 16(1).
220. Id. at art. 15(l)(m).
221. Id at art. 17(1).
222. Id
223. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(5) (1976).
224. U.N. Doc. A.CONF. 39/13, Annex I. art. 17(3) (1978).
225. Id at art. 17(4).
226. Id at art. 16(1).
227. Id at arts. 15(l)(b), 16(2).
228. Id at art. 16(3).
229. Id at art. 16(2).
230. Id at art. 16(3)(b).
231. Id at art. 16(4). Herein is a trap for carriers. When a bill reflecting receipt for carriage issues before loading, it may be impossible to calculate and, therefore, state freight and
loading port demurrage until cargo has been loaded and the vessel cleared to depart loading
berth. Subsequent failure of the shipper to "demand" a shipped bill when the values in question are calculable, id. at art. 15(2), or to accept one if tendered in exchange for the original
receipt, may leave a carrier both unable to successfully assert a lien in cargo against innocent

ers of all applications of Yone Suzuki v. CentralArgentineRailway,23 2
admit considerable sympathy with the aim of these proposals.
1. Insurance and General Average.-Similar to COGSA, a
clause assigning benefit of cargo insurance to the carrier is null and
void.2 33 Yet, the Rules specifically avoid interference with "provisions in the contract of carriage by sea or national law regarding the
adjustment of general average. ' 234 This, on its face, is more relaxed
than COGSA. 23 5 The Rules, however, would amplify by saying that
[T]he provisions of this Convention relating to the liability of the carrier for loss of or damage to the goods also determine whether
the consignee may refuse contribution in general average and the
liability of the carrier to indemnify the consignee in respect of any
such contribution made or any salvage paid.236
E.

Claims Handling

1. Timeliness.-While
COGSA provides that removal of
goods from carrier custody at discharging port, without protest of
readily apparent loss or damage, is prima facie evidence of delivery
as described in the bill,2 37 the Hamburg Rules relax this stricture.
The presumption of delivery in good condition could be avoided by
written notice given "not later than the working day after the day
when the goods were handed over to the consignee ... .
When
loss or damage is not apparent, COGSA looks to notice "within
three days" 239 but the Rules afford an even greater degree of relaxation by permitting notice within fifteen consecutive days.240 Similar
to COGSA, the Rules dispense with written notice if the "state of the
goods at the time they were handed over" had been the subject of
joint survey or inspection.24 ' Mutual provision of "all reasonable
facilities . . . for inspecting and tallying" in event of "actual or apthird parties and unfairly burdened against those not so innocent. Presumably, if the commercial and legal contexts should force issuance of bills upon receipt but before lading of goods,
carriers will endorse them with advices that consignees are liable for freight and demurrage as
per particularized formulae permitting calculation upon the carrier's provision of (what is,
under the Rules, a gratuitous) notice as of commencement of the agreed voyage.
232. 27 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 652 (1929).
233. Id at art. 23(1).
234. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 24(1) (1978).
235. "Nothing... shall be held to prevent the insertion in a bill of lading of any lawful
provision regarding general average." 46 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976). Full incorporation of the
York-Antwerp Rules would permit treating various sacrifices as though occasioned by a general average situation although the general maritime law as interpreted by United States courts
might not indulge the essential characterization. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 6, at 252-70.
236. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 24(2) (1978).
237. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1976).
238. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 19(l) (1978) (emphasis added).
239. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1976).
240. U.N. Doc. A/CONF/ 89/13, Annex I, art. 19(2) (1978).
241. Id at art. 19(3).

prehended loss or damage" is also contemplated.2 4 2
The Rules also provide against compensation "for loss resulting
from delay in delivery unless a notice [is] given in writing to the
carrier within 60 consecutive days after the day when the goods were
handed over to the consignee. '"243 Another novelty is an address to
the potency of belated claims by a carrier against the shipper. 2 "
Failure of the carrier to give written, particularized notice of "loss or
damage" to the shipper within ninety consecutive days after the later
of the occurrence of loss or delivery constitutes prima facie evidence
that the carrier sustained no loss due to fault or neglect of the shipper or its servants.24 5
It is interesting to note that belated notice of cargo loss or damage continues 246 to do little more than shift the burden of proof to
the cargo interest whereas lapse of the sixty day period 247 would
foreclose payment for late delivery. Since carriers already have the
burden of proof concerning shipper responsibility for injury to the
vessel or other cargo, 24 8 the ninety day notice requirement 24 9 does
not appear unduly burdensome.
The Rules look to a two year time bar 250 as opposed to the one
year statute of limitations in COGSA.2 5 ' Subject to national law,
alleged indemnitees are not barred by expiration of the two year period. Instead, they have ninety days from the time when either primary liability was fixed by settlement or the indemnitees were sued
on the primary obligation.2 5 2 Curiously, in American eyes, the Rules
explicitly recognize a potential defendant's ability to extend the limitation period "by a declaration in writing to the claimant. 2 5 3
2. Arbitration.-Quite apart from an endeavor to confer jurisdiction over disputes concerning application of the Rules upon virtually any court in which defendant can be caught and in which the
Rules are likely to be respected,2 54 the importance of arbitration in
the maritime world is recognized.2 55 Specifically attending to inno242. Id at art. 19(4).
243. Id at art. 19(5). See text accompanying notes 155-72 supra.
244. Id at art. 19(7).
245. Id
246. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1976).
247. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 19(1), (5) (1978).
248. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(3) (1976).
249. See text accompanying note 245 supra.
250. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 20(i) (1978).
251. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1976).
252. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 20(5) (1978).
253. Id at art. 20(4).
254. Id at art. 21(1). Is this an endeavor to short-circuit national laws concerning appropriateness of motions to dismiss as forum non conpeniens? The continued exercise of in rem
jurisdiction by some nations is recognized by the Rules. Id at art. 21(2).
255. Id at art. 22. See A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 238-39.

cent holders of bills issued pursuant to charterparties containing arbitration clauses, the Rules provide against subjection of such a
holder to arbitration at the carrier's instance unless the bill was
claused appropriately or the holder was otherwise on notice at the
time of acquisition."
F

Miscellany

1. Limited Liabilityfor Servants.-Lurking within an Article
captioned "Application to non-contractual claims" is a potential
overhead builder of dubious merit. After providing that "defences
and limits of liability provided" by the Hamburg Rules apply
whether a lawsuit proceeds "in contract, in tort or otherwise,"2'5 7 it is
provided that
[ilf such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the
carrier, such servant or agent, if he proves that he acted within the
scope of his employment, is entitled to avail himself of the
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under this Convention.
Is the purpose of this provision to confirm stevedores' entitlement to
limited liability? Is it to accommodate cargo interests with their burden concerning fire losses? While many of a carrier's shipboard servants may be judgment-proof in context of the value of a given loss,
is the spectre of losing the little they have likely to make them overly
cooperative with plaintiffs? To the degree that shoreside agents of
assumed financial strength are implicated, is the point to have them
protect those assets by casting themselves as the innocent tools of the
259
carrier?
In any event, it seems that this attention to servant and agent
liability presents such a potency for owners and their underwriters as
greatly to accent that implicit in a turnaround of the traditional approach to fire. Presumably, adoption of this approach to servant and
agent liability will lead to a whole new layer of overhead-building
agreements for indemnification.
2 Effective Date of the Hamburg Rules.-The HamburgRules
will not be in force until the first day of the month following lapse of
a year from the twentieth advice of ratification or accession.26 °
Thereafter, a comparable temporal formula will mark individual effectiveness of the Rules in each adhering state.2 6' Of course, nothing
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 22(2) (1978).
Id at art. 7(1). See A. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 291-93.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 7(2) (1978).
See generally A. MOCAT-rA, supra note 6, at 166-72.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13, Annex I, art. 30(i) (1978).
Id at art. 30(2).

save existing treaty commitments precludes a nation from enacting
the substance of the Rules as domestic law and, in the process, expediting effectiveness. Dates upon which the Rules become effective as
a multilateral convention, however, are quite important because
each contracting state must denounce the Hague Rules as of the date
upon which the HamburgRules become effective in that country.2 6 2
Limitation of liability schemes implicit in multilateral conventions (except those under the Hague Rules) and domestic law are
saved from preemption by the Hamburg Rules. Existing conventions
and later modifications of those conventions mandating applications
to contracts of carriage "primarily by" modes other than sea are similarly saved from preemption.2 63
IV.

Conclusions

The authors approached the Hamburg Rules with different perspectives. They were in agreement that anamolies implicit in survival of the Harter Act and in the relatively limited scope of COGSA
should be eliminated. They favored having one American regime
for international and coastwise carriage of goods, with particular
emphasis on the different approaches to exonerations for errors in
vessel management and navigation contained in existing statutes.
Extending the reach of COGSA to carriers' custodial periods before
lading and after discharge was also favored. The authors recognize a
serious need to address multimoda12 64 and containerized cargoes on
an explicit level. Only one of them, however, appreciates a glaring
need to deal explicitly with delays in transit. The other cannot accept that port management, vessel technology, vessel navigation, and
ability to anticipate events prejudicial to prosecuting voyages have
reached such a state of perfection that "delay" can be put on a par
with careless cargo handling.
While both agree that the United States is no longer an obvious
merchant marine power,26 5 only one is inclined to endorse reformation of existing rules to favor shippers and consignees on a theory
262. Id at art. 31(I). This denunciation extends to the Visby Amendments. Id at art.
31(3).
263. Id at art. 25.
264. The Hamburg Rules do not address multimodal carriage except in terms of limiting
application of the definition of "Contract of carriage by sea," id. at art. 1(6), and addressing
separate marine stages of "Through carriage," id at art. 11, which, seemingly, was consistent
with the Conference's writ from the General Assembly. REPORT, supra note 16, at paras. 47,
70. The influence of the Hamburg Rules is discernable, however, in the Draft Convention
published as a result of the fifth plenary session of the United Nations Conference on International Multimodal Transport on November 30, 1979. U.N. Doc. TD/MT/CONF/12 (1980).

265. The Report of the United States Delegation to the Hamburg Convention asserts that
foreign flag vessels now carry 95% of United States foreign trade volume. REPORT, supra note
16, at para. 37. Many foreign-flag vessels, however, are controlled by United States based
enterprises.

that American interests are once again necessarily coincident with
cargo interests. The other is quite dubious of any proposition that
flags displayed by ocean-going vessels are indicative of the actual
national economic interests involved. The authors join in urging
that no judgments be made on untested assumptions that we are a
nation of shippers and consignees cast forever into economic struggle
with carriers.
The authors suspect that the United States' signature on the
Hamburg Rules is nothing but assent to what amounts to a shell
game, intended to soothe those national delegations who believe that
reduction in premiums paid for cargo insurance will result in a net
saving appreciable in balances of payments. This suspicion is based
on various observations in the Report of the United States Delegation to the Hamburg Convention26 6 and on an assumption that carriers will not assume greater risk without purchasing added insurance
coverage appropriate to that risk. If this assumption is valid, added
premiums must impact freight quotations. Neither carriers' insurers
nor carriers can run a benefit for cargo. The best case for cargo, if
the Rules achieve broad acceptance, would be no long range effect
on net costs of carriage. A worse and more likely consequence
would be an increase in freights caused by the passing along of insurers' overhead increases implicit in adapting underwriting and adjusting functions to the new arrangements.
The authors agree that, if the net effect of the Rules is merely to
shift business among types of insurers, all concerned have been wasting time and endorsement of the Rules would be tantamount to encouraging a charade as a patronizingly short-term address to a
perceived but somewhat unrealistically defined set of problems from
which no nation or class of commercial interest will derive ultimate
advantage.
If it can be demonstrated that reallocation of risks between
cargo and carrier interests will produce economic efficiencies, the authors will have no choice but to support the principle implicit in the
Rules, but they will not do so uncritically. The burden is on those
supporting the Rules to make the economic and implementing cases.
266. The Report cannot be described as a strong endorsement of the Rules. While the
author of the Report seems to claim success in terms of the objectives given the United States
Delegation, id. paras. 67-69, the principal claims to achievements (revised approach to quantified limits of liability; expansion of carriers' period of responsibility to Harter-like scope, etc.),
id. para. 69, seem so balanced by reservations as to impact on underwriting costs, etc. and
recognitions of mischief (definition of carrier, shipper, and bill of lading; approach to fire;
through carriage; etc.), id. para. 66, to make one wonder anew at the rapidity of signature by
the United States. One infers that the chief virtue of the Rules is a claim to be "the best hope
now for uniformity in this important area of international law." Id para. 73. However, if the
principal trading nations were to stay with the Hague Rules buttressed by more realistic limitation formulae, would not uniformity be served as well as by an overhead-inducing shift to the
Hamburg Rules?

Predictably, proponents of the Rules will seek to shift the burden to
not only carrier interests but also those who merely ask what the
benefit of the Rules (other than esthetic) may be. The authors maintain that the President and Congress should recognize that, if the
Hamburg Rules are adopted in the cause of relieving developing nations, the ultimate consequence of not realizing such relief is likely to
be witless finger-pointing at institutional underwriters and cries for
2 67
supranational regulation of those who insure against marine risks.

267. Quite apart from this recognition of the inevitable consequences of exciting unattainable expectations, the potency for the United States being compelled to restore its merchant
fleet, see D. Middleton, Merchant Fleet. Key Weakness For U.S Forces, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18,
1980, A5, carries with it a need to evaluate the impact of the Hamburg Rules on a newlyemerging carrying industry.

